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海德格尔思想中的身体隐匿问题在西方学界一直备受诟病，但《存在与时间》的此在分析却经由德雷福斯等学者的阐释，启发了20世纪人工智能具身研究的发展。这表明海德格尔现象学中暗含了某种不明显的身体观。德雷福斯将海德格尔的“存在理解”解读为前反思的具身意向性，后者是支配人类具身实践的情境化理解，无法被还原为抽象统一的逻辑符号和人工计算机语言，基于此，德雷福斯批驳了人工智能表征主义思想。本文尝试立足于德雷福斯的工作，重构海德格尔的身体阐释：现象学身体不是自然主义视角下物理生物系统的躯体，而是一种前反思性的情境化理解的具身形式。
Abstract：The problem of the invisibility of the body in Heidegger's philosophy has been much criticised in Western scholarship,but meanwhile the Dasein-analysis in Being and Time has inspired the development of the study of the embodiment of artificial intelligence in the last century through the elaboration of scholars such as Dreyfus. This suggests that there is a certain unobtrusive view of the body implicit in Heidegger's phenomenology. Based on his reading of Heidegger's“existential understanding”as pre-reflective embodied intentionality,which is a contextual understanding that governs human embodied practice and is not reducible to an abstract and unified logical symbols and artificial language of computers,Dreyfus refutes the idea of AI representationalism. Grounded in Dreyfus' s work,this paper attempts to reconstruct Heidegger's interpretation of the body:the phenomenological body is not the body of a physical-biological system in a naturalistic perspective,but an embodied form of pre-reflexive contextual understanding.
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(1)此处，值得提及的是德雷福斯对胡塞尔的误解，前者追随海德格尔，认为胡塞尔现象学囿于纯粹意识领域，而忽略了具身意向性，但这仅限于早期胡塞尔思想。后期胡塞尔的诸多文本都严肃地探讨了身体性，并将身体当作超越论主体的视域构造的关键要素和环节。胡塞尔看到，我们的事物感知经验都是视域性的，因为在每一个当下，我们所能实际感知的到只有事物的一个侧面，我们之所以能将事物当作一个整体，是因为我们有关于事物其他侧面的视域。如兰德格雷贝所指出，根据胡塞尔，我们的每一个经验都具有视域性的“可能性索引”，也即，具有这样的一种形式：“我能够继续，并且我可能会获得关于这个东西的这个或者那个印象。”（Landgrebe L.,The Phenomenological Concept of Experience. In:Philos Phenomenol Res,34(1),1973,pp. 1–13）这意味着，我们的每一种经验都隐含了空间性和时间性的视角，而这都依赖于身体的移动。胡塞尔对于意向性之具身性的论述也启发了汤普森等神经认知科学家的生成认知进路，当然这又是另一个话题。
(1)海德格尔对传统形而上学的批判使德雷福斯看到，框架理论的哲学基础也可追溯至西方自柏拉图以来的本体论传统，正如本体论哲学家们两千年来总是希望从人类多样的现实中提炼出抽象统一的规则以解释万物那样，计算机专家们也总是试图从人类情境中抽象出来，假定所有的人类实践及其环境都受普适的规则支配，从而使用无情境的比特搭建人的实践模型。（Cf. Dreyfus,1992,p. 271）
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2025.03.001
中图分类号:B516.54
引用信息:
[1]刘环.现象学身体作为情境化理解的具身形式——论海德格尔现象学和当代人工智能研究中的具身问题[J].浙江社会科学,2025,No.343(03):113-122+159.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2025.03.001.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金一般项目“发生现象学视野下的意识主体研究”（编号505305-S12301ZJ）的阶段性成果
2025-03-15
2025-03-15