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习惯法是否是有效的法学概念,这部分地取决于习惯在实践推理中扮演什么样的独特角色,以及该角色是否与法律的根本特征相冲突。现有的三种习惯概念——哈特式的习惯概念、协作习惯论、构成性习惯论都未能揭示出习惯为行动者给出的理由的完整结构,一种完整的习惯概念必然是基于实质价值论证的。此种习惯概念将为习惯法概念的有效性扫清一些理论障碍。
Abstract：Whether customary law is an effective legal concept depends in part on the unique role that custom plays in practical reasoning and whether it conflicts with the nature of law. The theories of Hart-style custom, coordinative customs, and constitutive customs failed to reveal the complete structure of reasons that customs give to actors. A successful custom concept theory must be based on substantive values. This customary concept will clear some theoretical obstacles to the concept of customary law.
(1)(51)参见刘叶深:《法律概念分析的性质》,《法律科学》2011年第1期,第21~22、29~30页。
(2)陈景辉:《习惯法是法律吗?》,《法学》2018年第1期,第4~5页。
(3)E.g.see Matthew H.Kramer,Where Law and Morality Meet,Oxford University Press,2004,pp.91~97.See also Matthew H.Kramer,Why The Axioms and Theorems of Arithmetic are not Legal Norms,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,vol.27,no.3(2007),pp.555~560.
(4)概念分析要从典型情形着手,参见刘叶深:《法律概念分析的性质》,第22页。
(5)See Joseph Raz,The Concept of a Legal System,Clarendon Press,1970,pp.203~205.
(6)See e.g.H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,3rd,Clarendon Press,2012,p.203.
(7)See Gerald Postema,Custom,Normative Practice,and the Law,Duke Law Journal,Vol.62(2012),pp.709~714.
(8)John Gardner,Law as a Leap of Faith,Oxford University Press,2012,p.67.
(9)H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.91~99.
(10)关于判例法概念的分析参见John Gardner,Law as a Leap of Faith,pp.74~82.
(11)See Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,Princeton University Press,2009,pp.5~8.
(12)Ibid.,p.8.
(13)See Joseph Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,Oxford University Press,1999,pp.35~39.
(14)杰里米·沃尔德伦就明确提出,权威性理由未必一定预设着权威的存在,这可以印证本文对两种权威性的区分,see Jeremy Waldron,Law and Disagreement,Clarendon Press,1999,pp.129~138.得出类似结论的,see David Enoch,Authority and Reason-giving,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,vol.LXXXIX,No.2,2014,pp.298~301.安德瑞·马默则与沃尔德伦的观点相对,提出了一种人格化的权威观,see Andrei Marmor,Positive Law and Objective Values,Clarendon Press,2001,pp.104~110.
(15)但是朱莉·迪克森认为哈特在该书第一版中没打算对规则、习惯这些概念作完整的哲学分析,see Julie Dickson,Is the Rule of Recognition Really Conventional?Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,vol.27(2007),issue 3,pp.374~382.
(16)H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.90~91.
(17)当然哈特并没有说这一理论模式是用来分析习惯的,但在《法律的概念》“后记”中他也接受了“承认规则”是司法领域中的习惯性规则。这也为本文这一判定提供了旁证。See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.254~259.另外参见陈景辉:《习惯法是法律吗?》,第4~6页。
(18)Gerald Postema,Custom,Normative Practice,and the Law,pp.715~717.
(19)这个例子以及相应的批评来自于罗纳德·德沃金,see Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Harvard University Press,1977,p.52.
(20)Gerald Postema,Custom,Normative Practice,and the Law,pp.716~717.
(21)See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.49~52.Joseph Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.53~58.
(22)See David Lewis,Convention:A Philosophical Study,Harvard University Press,1969,pp.8~35.
(23)H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.250~254.
(24)See Jules Coleman,The Practice of Principle:In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory,Oxford University Press,2001,pp.96~102.
(25)See John Finnis,Philosophy of Law,Oxford University Press,2001,pp.66~73.
(26)See Gerald Postema,Coordination and Convention at the Foundation of Law,Journal of Legal Studies,vol.XI(1982),pp.167~172.
(27)哈特认为这种习惯在官员群体内存在即可,See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.116~117.但波斯特玛反驳了这一观点,See Gerald Postema,Coordination and Convention at the Foundation of Law,pp.182~186.
(28)See Leslie Green,Positivism and Conventionalism,Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,vol.XXI,no.1(1999),p.46.
(29)H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.117.
(30)David Lewis,Convention:A Philosophical Study,pp.76~79.
(31)值得注意的是安德瑞·马默反对协作可以作为所有习惯的共有特征,他认为关于习惯的功能是可以有分歧并彼此争论的,但这如何说明习惯都具有“依赖于服从的理由”,马默似乎并未给出合理的说明。See Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,p.54.
(32)See George Letsas,The DNA of Conventions,Law and Philosophy(2014),vol.33,pp.563~564.
(33)See John Gardner,T.Macklem,Reasons,in Jules Coleman ed.,Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law,Oxford University Press,2002,pp.440~475.
(34)George Letsas,The DNA of Conventions,p.552.
(35)Leslie Green,Positivism and Conventionalism,pp.43~44.
(36)Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,p.2.
(37)Andrei Marmor,Positive Law and Objective Values,pp.26~27.
(38)其实准确地说,构成性习惯已经涵盖了协作性习惯,马默对此未能清晰表述。限于篇幅未能辩驳澄清,依循马默的表述。
(39)当然,某种实践的价值不仅体现在指引该种实践的规则上,也体现在从事该种实践所采取的的策略上。某种消极怠工的比赛态度和行为,也会使竞技性这种价值无法实现。See Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,pp.36~37.
(40)乔治·莱特萨斯称这些理由为“动机性理由”(motivated reasons),因为这些理由已经驱动大多数人如此行为。See George Letsas,The DNA of Conventions,p.537.
(41)Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,pp.49~50.
(42)Ibid.,p.149.
(43)Ibid.,pp.134~135.
(44)Andrei Marmor,Positive Law and Objective Values,p.27.
(45)Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,p.136.
(46)See Ronald Dworkin,Sovereign Virtues:The Theory and Practice of Equality,Harvard University Press,2000,pp.267~274.
(47)Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,pp.136~139.
(48)马默更赞同作出承诺是在回应道德理由,而不是援引实践这一观点。但是他认为,两种观点都不影响其最终结论,See Andrei Marmor,Social Conventions:From Language to Law,p.137.
(49)George Letsas,The DNA of Conventions,pp.567~569.
(50)关于邪恶习惯的问题,莱特萨斯直接否认了邪恶习惯存在的可能性,将纳粹集团的行为规则排除至习惯概念之外,See George Letsas,The DNA of Conventions,pp.567~569.;而Dickson则允许用描述性的视角来看待习惯概念,See Julie Dickson,Is the Rule of Recognition Really Conventional?pp.396~401。这两种解决方案与本文均有不同。
(52)其他学者给出的习惯理论也基本止步于形式分析,参见George Letsas,The DNA of Conventions,and See Gerald Postema,Custom,Normative Practice,and the Law.迪米特里奥斯·凯里特西斯是个例外,他试图诉诸于民主理论来说明法律中的习惯,see Dimitrios Kyritsis,What is Good about Legal Conventionalism?,Legal Theory,14(2008),pp.135~166.
(53)杰拉德·波斯特玛指出了这一点,并把其追溯到朗·富勒,See Gerald Postema,Custom,Normative Practice,and the Law,pp.724~726.
(54)Andrei Marmor,Positive Law and Objective Values,pp.97~101.
(55)See John Rawls,A Theory of Justice,Harvard University Press,1971,pp.335~336.对罗尔斯自然义务理论有代表性的批评参见约翰·西蒙斯:《道德原则与政治义务》,郭为桂、李艳丽译,江苏人民出版社2009年版,第132~140页。
(56)See John Finnis,Natural law and Natural Rights,2nd,Clarendon Press,2011,pp.9~11.and See John Rawls,ATheory of Justice,pp.350~355.
(57)See Grant Lamond,Coercion and the Nature of Law,Legal Theory,7(2001),pp.54~56.
(58)John Rawls,A Theory of Justice,pp.453~461,pp.496~503.
(59)See John Rawls,Political Liberalism,Columbia University Press,1996,pp.140~144.and See Jeremy Waldron,Law and Disagreement,pp.188~205.
(60)See Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Clarendon Press,1986,pp.53~57.
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2019.02.007
中图分类号:D920.4
引用信息:
[1]刘叶深.论习惯在实践推理中的角色[J].浙江社会科学,2019,No.270(02):50-60+157.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2019.02.007.
2019-02-15
2019-02-15