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作为第二代财政联邦制的主要理论的市场维护型联邦主义理论,在上世纪九十年代被提出并系统阐释后,被广泛地运用于分析包括中国在内的发展中国家的经济发展。本文从制度主义理论的视角出发,从方法论和实质理论两方面,对作为理性选择制度主义的市场维护型联邦制理论进行一个批评性回顾。本文认为基于演绎法推出的市场维护型财政联邦制无法有效解释现实困惑,需要进行修正。并对进一步的研究进行了探讨。
Abstract：Market-preserving federalism,the main theory of the second generation fiscal federalism,was developed and systematically illustrated in the 1990s,and was widely used to explain the economic growth in many developing countries including China. This paper critically reviews the market- preserving federalism which is a rational choice institutionalism from both the methodological and substantial theory perspectives. It considers that the market-preserving fiscal federalism launched by deductive method is unable to explain realistic puzzles and needs to be revised. It also discusses the possible directions for further researches.
①③奥茨:《财政联邦主义》,译林出版社2012年版,中文版序。
②两个很好的介绍,参见杨其静、聂辉华:《保护市场的联邦主义及其批判:基于文献的一个思考》,《经济研究》2008年第3期;吴俊培、李淼焱:《财政联邦主义理论述评》,《财政监督》2012年第22期。
④Tiebout,Charles,1956,“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”,Journal of Political Economy,64(5):416-424.
⑤North,Douglass and Barry Weingast,1989,“Constitutions and Commitment:The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century Britain”,Journal of Economic History,49(4),pp.803-832.
⑥Weingast,Barry R.,1995,“The Economic Role of Political Institutions:Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”,Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,(Spring)11:1-31.Qian,Yingyi,and Barry R.Weingast,1997,“Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,(Fall)11:83-92.
⑦Montinola,Gabriella,Yingyi Qian,and Barry R.Weingast,1995,“Federalism,Chinese Style:The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”,World Politics,(October)48:50-81;Qian,Yingyi and Barry R.Weingast,“China's Transition to Markets:Market-Preserving Federalism,Chinese Style”,Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2),pp.149-185.
⑧蔡欣怡:《发展型国家理论和市场保护型联邦主义模型在中国缘何没有解释力?》,《经济社会体制比较》2011年第01期。
⑨杨其静、聂辉华,前引文。
⑩格林和夏皮罗:《理性选择理论的病变:政治学应用批判》,广西师范大学出版社2004年版,第46-52页。
Wademan,Andrew,From Mao to Market,Cambridge University Press,2003.chapter 3.Rent seeking and protection.
Bates,Robert.et al,Analytic narratives,Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1998.
不同于前者,“嵌入分析”(Nested Analysis)先进行定量分析然后检查是否有“特殊的”个案,再深入分析这些个案为何不符合大样本的因果关系。见Lieberman,Evan,“Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research”,American Political Science Review,(v 99,n3,2005),435-52.
格林和夏皮罗:《理性选择理论的病变》,第50~52页。
Cai,Hongbin and Daniel Treisman,2006,“Did Government Decentralization Cause China's Economic Miracle?”,World Politics,58(4):505-535.
Sinha,Aseema,“Political Foundations of Market-Enhancing Federalism:Theoretical Lessons from India and China”,Comparative Politics,Vol.37,No.3(Apr.,2005),pp.337-356.
Wibbels,Erik,Federalism and the market:intergovernmental conflict and economic reform in the developing world,Cambridge;New York:Cambridge University Press,2005.Weingast,Barry,“Rational Choice Institutionalism”,in Ira Katznelson and Helen V.Milner,eds.,Political Science,Stateof the Discipline:Reconsidering Power,Choice,and the State.New York:Norton,2002.
白素珊:《乡村中国的权力与财富:制度变迁的政治经济学》,浙江人民出版社2009年版。
Ostrom,Elinor,Understanding institutional diversity,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2005.
蔡和Treisman认为:行政性分权意味着中央政府允许地方政府制定某些政策,但上级政府保留审查权和否决权。政治分权意味着下面两者之一:地方政府可以制定某些政策且不受上级审查和否决;地方政府由当地居民(选举)产生而不是由上级任命。财政分权则有多种含义。本文一开始提到的多层级政府的财政关系就是联邦制财政是最为宽泛的,一个非常严格的定义是认为财政联邦制有两大必要条件:一是地方政府在全国性的立法机构中有代表权;二是地方政府自身有选举出来的立法机构。见Wibbels,前引文,p26。
周黎安:《晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作》,《经济研究》2004年第6期。
Wibbels,前引文:p32。
Weingast,Barry,“Second Generation Fiscal Federalism:Implications for Decentralized Democratic Governance and Economic Development”,Working Paper,June,2006.
Jean Oi,1992,“Fiscal Decentralization and Local State Corporatism”,World Politics.
2011年我国财政收入占GDP比重应该在26%~30%,另一个数字是中央政府支出占全国财政支出的比重:中国是20%左右。这还没有将地方政府社会保险基金支出、来自土地出让金发生的支出全部计算在内。如果将这些计算在内,中央政府的支出比重会更低。楼继伟,“中国需要继续深化改革的六项制度”,《比较》辑刊2011年第6辑。
杨宏星、赵鼎新:《绩效合法性与中国经济奇迹》,《学海》2013年第3期。
Treisman,D.,After the deluge:regional crises and political consolidation in Russia,1999,Ann Arbor,Mich.:University of Michigan Press.
Wademan,Andrew,From Mao to Market,Cambridge University Press,2003.chapter 3.Rent seeking and protection.
苏黛瑞:《在中国城市中争取公民权》,浙江人民出版社2009年版。
Lee,C.K.,Against the law:labor protests in China's rustbelt and sunbelt,Berkeley,University of California Press,2007.
Bernstein,Tomas and XiaoboLü,Taxation without representation in contemporary rural China,Cambridge modern China series.2003,Cambridge;New York:Cambridge University Press.
陈志勇、陈莉莉:《“土地财政”问题及其治理研究》,经济科学出版社2012年版;周飞舟:《以利为利:财政关系与地方政府行为》,上海三联书店2012年版。
曹正汉、史晋川:《中国地方政府应对市场化改革的策略:抓住经济发展的主动权》,《社会学研究》2009年第4期。
Treisman,D.,After the deluge:regional crises and political consolidation in Russia,1999,Ann Arbor,Mich.:University of Michigan Press.
Qian,Yingyi and Gérard Roland,“Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint”,The American Economic Review,Vol.88,No.5(Dec.,1998):1143-1162
Steinfeld,Edward,Forging reform in China:the fate of state-owned industry,Cambridge modern China series,1998,Cambridge,UK;New York:Cambridge University Press.
这方面文献很多,如敬志红:《地方政府性债务管理研究——兼论地方投融资平台管理》,中国农业出版社2011年版。
张千帆、葛维宝:《中央与地方关系的法治化》,凤凰出版传媒集团、译林出版社2009年版。
Treisman,Daniel,The architecture of government:rethinking political decentralization,Cambridge studies in comparative politics,2007,Cambridge;New York:Cambridge University Press.
Zheng,Yu et al.,“Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes:A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China”,Comparative Politics,2011.43(4):401-419.
彼得森:《联邦主义的代价》,北京大学出版社2011年版。
Rodden,Jonathan.et al.,Fiscal decentralization and the challenge of hard budget constraints,Cambridge,Mass.:MIT Press,2003.
Rodden,J.,Hamilton's paradox:the promise and peril of fiscal federalism,Cambridge studies in comparative politics,2006,Cambridge;New York:Cambridge University Press.
Wibbels,前引文,第48~49页。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2014.02.018
中图分类号:F091.349
引用信息:
[1]张长东.论制度主义视角下的市场维护型联邦主义[J].浙江社会科学,2014,No.210(02):25-32+155-156.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2014.02.018.
2014-02-15
2014-02-15