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2025, 07, No.347 32-43+156
价值医疗导向的经济激励与医生利他行为——基于礼物交换博弈实验
基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目“价值医疗导向的医生利他行为与激励要素互惠相容机制研究”(72174129)阶段性研究成果
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DOI: 10.14167/j.zjss.2025.07.006
发布时间: 2025-07-15
出版时间: 2025-07-15
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摘要:

本文构建医生、患者、管理者之间“委托-代理”关系下的间接互惠利他框架,设计价值医疗导向的质量激励模式,并以传统的数量激励模式为对照,运用礼物交换博弈实验检验不同激励模式下的互惠相容机制。研究结果表明:数量激励模式与质量激励模式下均存在互惠机制;质量激励模式具有促使医生、患者、管理者三方目标趋向统一的长期效应,更有利于实现互惠利他和激励相容;质量激励模式对利他程度较高的医生群体具有更强的激励效应。本研究为价值医疗理念的实践提供了思路,也为构建符合医疗行业特点的医生薪酬制度提供了参考。

Abstract:

We develop value-based healthcare-oriented compensation incentives,compared with the traditional quantity-based incentive model under the principal-agent relationship among doctors,patients,and hospital administrators. We analyze the reciprocity-compatible mechanism under different incentive models using a gift exchange game experiment. Our findings show that a reciprocal mechanism exists under both quantitative and qualitative incentive models. The quality incentive model is more conducive to promoting goal alignment among doctors,patients,and managers,thereby achieving mutual benefit,altruism,and incentive compatibility. Furthermore,the effects of quality incentives vary among physicians with different preferences for altruism. This research provides insights for designing value-based healthcare-oriented incentives and serves as a reference for constructing incentive mechanisms that align with the characteristics of the healthcare industry.

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(1)医疗服务量为0、患者健康收益大于0的情况出现是因为实验组认为医生提供较高程度过度服务时的患者健康收益比不提供服务时的患者健康收益小。

基本信息:

DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2025.07.006

中图分类号:F069.9;R1

引用信息:

[1]李心言,刘文婷,张悦,等.价值医疗导向的经济激励与医生利他行为——基于礼物交换博弈实验[J].浙江社会科学,2025,No.347(07):32-43+156.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2025.07.006.

基金信息:

国家自然科学基金面上项目“价值医疗导向的医生利他行为与激励要素互惠相容机制研究”(72174129)阶段性研究成果

发布时间:

2025-07-15

出版时间:

2025-07-15

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