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产品质量安全信息在买方与卖方之间的分布不对称,是导致产品市场发生"逆向选择"或"道德风险"的根本原因。引入标准规制能在一定程度上解决信息不对称问题,但不同市场结构下标准规制的干预强度及对不同厂商的激励效果存在争议。同时,产品责任制可以内部化预期事故成本激励生产具有潜在危害产品的厂商在事前采取预防措施。但两种规制也越来越多地面临高规制成本的质疑,低交易成本的声誉治理便可作为补充。本文综述产品质量安全领域的标准规制、产品责任制及声誉治理机制研究,重点梳理微观经济学模型的演化逻辑,为后续的基础理论研究提供比较全面的概览。
Abstract：Information asymmetry about product quality and safety between buyer and seller is the main reason that leading market to " adverse selection" or " moral hazard". In a certain extent,standard regulation can reduce information asymmetry,while the intensity of intervention and the motivation for different product manufacturers under different market structure are controversial. Meanwhile,product responsibility system can motivate product manufacturer incentive to take preventive actions before production process through internalization expected accident cost. But these two regulations are increasingly facing the query of high regulation cost,while reputation governance with lower transaction cost can be used as a supplement. This paper reviews the standard regulation,product responsibility system and reputation governance mechanism in the field of product quality,and analyzes the evolution logic of the microeconomic model,these provide a comprehensive overview for future researches.
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1 从信息经济学的角度按照产品属性可以将产品归为三种类型:搜寻品、体验品和信任品。搜寻品是指消费者在购买体验之前可以通过一定的搜寻就可以获得的相关属性,如商品的计量、价格、颜色等;体验品则是指产品的属性只有在购买体验后才能准确感知,如各类专业服务、劳务、电器等产品;信任品特性典型的如药品、食品及其他具有潜在危害的产品,这些产品的质量安全属性即使在购买使用后也不一定能准确感知,或者说需要花费其他额外的成本如专业的质量鉴定才能获得准确的质量安全信息(Nelson,1970;Darby and Karni,1973)。
2 如食品、药品、化妆品等的质量安全标准,生活电器、工业产品的安全标准,律师、会计师等专业技术服务的职业资格等。
3 如转基因技术和生物制药等。
4 这里的完全信息与不完全信息模型是按照厂商与消费者之间关于产品质量信息认知是否完全进行分类,而不考虑厂商之间的信息认知。如在双寡头垄断模型中,一个厂商可能不清楚另外一个厂商的生产技术、生产成本等信息。虽然完全信息垂直差异模型不涉及产品质量安全体验品与信任品特性的研究,但是因为最低质量标准能影响厂商之间的垂直差异竞争均衡,而且不完全信息的垂直差异模型也是以此为基础拓展到对最低质量标准规制的研究,因此有必要对其进行概述。
5 还有双边事故模型,如交通事故。
6 还有另外一类研究集中在法理框架下对产品责任归则原则、适用范围的分析。实际上,不管是过失责任还是严格责任,法理学的分析都未能回答不同责任原则对施害人在事前的激励强度如何。本文不对这类文献进行综述。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2015.05.008
中图分类号:F273.2
引用信息:
[1]汪晓辉,史晋川.标准规制、产品责任制与声誉——产品质量安全治理研究综述[J].浙江社会科学,2015,No.225(05):50-59+156-157.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2015.05.008.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金青年基金《基于利益相关者行为博弈的产品安全问题研究》(13CJY003);; 国家社会科学青年基金《基于纵向一体化的产品安全问题研究》(12CJL036)的资助
2015-05-15
2015-05-15