| 915 | 9 | 110 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
《平台经济领域的反垄断指南》分别引入美国与欧盟司法实践中的“信息交流说”与“知悉规则”，作为互联网共谋行为经营者主观联系的认定标准，从而将算法共谋问题推至我国反垄断法实践与理论的前台。学理上，算法共谋行为可分为信使型共谋、轴辐协议型共谋、可预测代理型共谋和电子眼型共谋。无论何种类型，反竞争共谋关系的形成都取决于经营者之间的相互依赖程度，而算法程序的广泛使用深刻改变了经营者之间的依赖关系。依据博弈论对依赖关系的解释，算法时代经营者之间的博弈关系由“人—人”依赖性转变为“人—机”控制关系下的算法交互关系。规范算法共谋行为的理论路径为，通过“人—机”控制关系与算法交互关系的结合来构建算法共谋中的经营者主观联系标准。
Abstract：The Antitrust Guidelines in the Field of Platform Economy introduces the“information exchange”and“knowledge rule”in the judicial practice of the United States and the European Union respectively as the criteria for determining the subjective connection of the operator of the Internet conspiracy,thus bringing the issue of algorithmic conspiracy to the forefront of the practice and theory of China's antitrust law. Theoretically,algorithmic conspiracy can be divided into messenger type conspiracy,huband-spoke agreement type conspiracy,predictable agent type conspiracy and electronic eye type conspiracy. The formation of anti-competitive conspiracies of each type depends on the degree of interdependence between agents,and the widespread use of algorithmic procedures has profoundly changed the interdependence between agents. According to the game-theoretic explanation of the interdependence relationship,in the algorithmic era the interdependence between operators has changed from“human-human”interdependence to algorithmic interaction under the“human-machine”control relationship. The general criterion of algorithmic conspiracy can be constructed by combining the human-machine control relationship and the algorithmic interaction relationship to construct the criterion of subjective linkage of operators.
1.Green,E.J.,et al.，“Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly”,The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics,Ox-ford:Oxford University Press,2013:464~497.
2.Deng,A.，“What Do We Know about Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?”,Antitrust,2018,33(1):88~95.
3.Zhang,L.，“When Platform Capitalism Meets Petty Capitalism in China:Alibaba and an Integrated Approach to Plat-formization”,International Journal of Communication,2020,14:114~134．
4.苏治、荆文君、孙宝文：《分层式垄断竞争：互联网行业市场结构特征研究》，《管理世界》2018年第4期。
5.曾雄：《人工智能时代下算法共谋的反垄断法规制》，《网络法律评论》2016年第2期。
6.韩伟：《算法合谋反垄断初探--OECD〈算法与合谋〉报告介评（上）》，《竞争政策研究》2017年第5期。
7.李振利、李毅：《论算法共谋的反垄断规制路径》，《学术交流》2018年第7期。
8.柳欣玥：《垄断协议规制中算法合谋分类研究》，《竞争政策研究》2019年第5期。
9.肖红军：《算法责任：理论证成、全景画像与治理范式》，《管理世界》2022年第4期。
10.Pace,J.，“The Concept of Digital Capitalism”,Communication Theory,2018,28(3):254~269.
11.Bernhardt,L.&Dewenter,R.，“Collusion by Code or Algorithmic Collusion?When Pricing Algorithms Take Over”,European Competition Journal,2020,16(2):312~342.
12.Veljanovski,C.，“Algorithmic Antitrust:A Critical Overview”,Algorithmic Antitrust,2022:39~64.
13.Ezrachi,A.&Stucke,M.,E.,Virtual Competition:The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-driven Economy,Cam-bridge:Harvard University Press,2016.
14.Ezrachi,A.&Stucke,M.,E.，“Two Artificial Neural Networks Meet in an Online Hub and Change the Future”,Uni-versity of Tennessee College of Law,2017,7(323):1~54a.
15.Ezrachi,A.&Stucke,M.,E.，“Artificial Intelligence&Collusion:When Computers Inhibit Competition”,Universi-ty of Illinois Law Review,2017,5:1775~1810b.
16.Ezrachi,A.&Stucke,M.,E.，“Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion”,Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property,2020,17(2):217~260.
17.Mehra,S.K.，“US v.Topkins:Can Price Fixing Be Based on Algorithms?”,Journal of European Competition Law&Practice,2016,7(7):470~474.
18.De Bandt,P.&Probst,J.，“Proving Concentration in the Text of Online Platforms:A Comment on the Eturas Case”,European Competition and Regulatory Law Review,2017,1(1):74~79.
19.Kaplow,L.，“On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law”,California Law Review,2011,99(3):683~818.
20.Leslie,C.,R.，“Trust,Distrust,and Antitrust”,Tesas Law Review,2004,82(3):515~680.
21.Leslie,C.,R.，“The Probative Synergy of Plus Factors in Price-fixing Litigation”,Northwestern University Law Re-view,2021,115(6):1581~1648.
22.Turner,D.,F.，“The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act:Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal”,Harvard Law Review,1962,75(4):655~706.
23.Hovenkamp,H.&Leslie,C.,R.，“The Firm as Cartel Manager”,Vanderbilt Law Review,2011,64(3):811~874.
24.Hovenkamp,H.,The Antitrust Enterprise:Principle and Execution,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2008.
25.Schwalbe,U.，“Algorithms,Machine Learning,and Collusion”,Journal of Competition Law&Economics,2018,14(4):568~607.
26.Isgenc,I.，“Competition Law in the AI Era:Algorithmic Collusion under EU Competition”,Trinity College Law Re-view,2021,24(35):35~54.
27.Hay,G.,A.&Werden,G.，“Horizontal Mergers:Law,Policy,and Economics”,Antitrust and Industrial Organiza-tion,1993,83(2):173~177.
28.Nirvikar,S.&Xavier,V.，“Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly”,Rand Journal Economics Theory,1984,15(4):546~554.
29.Chamberlin,E.，“Duopoly:Value Where Sellers Are Few”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1929,44(63):63~100.
30.Cabral,L.,M.,B.,Introduction to Industrial Organization,Cambridge:The MIT Press,2002.
31.Stigler,G.,J.，“A Theory of Oligopoly”,Journal of Political Economy,1964,72(1):44~61.
32.Posner,R.,A.，“The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis”,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,1979,127(4):925~948.
33.Petit,N.，“The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law”,Handbook on European Competition Law,Chelten-ham:Edward Elgar,2013:259~349.
34.Friedman,J.,W.，“A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames”,Review of Economic Studies,1971,38(1):1~12.
35.Feuerstein,S.，“Collusion in Industrial Economics-A Survey”,Journal of Industry Competition and Trade,2005,5(3):163~198.
36.Yao,D.,A.&De Santi,S.,S.，“Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion”,Antitrust Bulletin,1993,38(1):113~142.
37.Gal,M.,S.&Elkin-Koren,N.，“Algorithmic Consumers”,Harvard Journal of Law&Technology,2017,30(2):309~354.
38.Gal,M.,S.，“Algorithms as Illegal Agreements”,Berkeley Technology Law Journal,2019,34(1):67~118.
39.Ittoo,A.&Petit,N.，“Algorithmic Pricing Agents and Tacit Collusion:A Technological Prspective”,Chapter in L'in-telligence Artificielle et le Droit,2017:241~256.
40.Hwang,S.,B.&Kim,S.，“Dynamic Pricing Qlgorithm for E-commerce”,Advances in Systems,Computing Scienc-es and Software Engineering:Proceedings of SCSS05,Dordrecht:Springer,2006:149~155.
41.Colombo,N.，“Virtual Competition:Human Liability Vis-a-Vis Artificial Intelligence's Anticompetitive Behaviours”,European Competition and Regulatory Law Review,2018,2(1):11~23.
(1)参见United States v. Topkins，网址https：//www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-david-topkins。
(1)参见Eturas UAB and Others v. Lietuvos Respublikos Konkirencijos Taryva，网址https：//eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0074。
(2)参见OECD发布的报告：Algorithms and Collusion:Competition Policy in the Digital Age，网址https：//www.oecd.org/en/publications/algorithms-and-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age_258dcb14-en.html。
(3)参见Digital Change Requires Legal Adjustments Regarding Price Algorithms，网址https：//www.monopolkommission.de/en/reports/biennialreports/218-biennial-report-xxii-competition-2018.html。
(1)参见OECD发布的报告：Algorithms and Collusion:Competition Policy in the Digital Age，网址https：//www.oecd.org/en/publications/algorithms-and-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age_258dcb14-en.html。
(2)参见OECD发布的报告：Algorithms and Collusion:Competition Policy in the Digital Age，网址https：//www.oecd.org/en/publications/algorithms-and-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age_258dcb14-en.html。
(3)参见European Union发布的报告：Algorithms and Collusion，网址https：//one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12/en/pdf。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2024.12.007
中图分类号:D922.294;TP30
引用信息:
[1]苏新建,沈运峰.算法共谋主观联系标准构建：从主体依赖性迈向算法交互性[J].浙江社会科学,2024,No.340(12):36-49+156.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2024.12.007.
基金信息:
2022年度浙江省软科学项目一般项目“应急管理程序对公众政府信任的影响及完善对策研究”（2022C35020）的阶段性成果
2024-12-15
2024-12-15