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2017, 02, No.246 40-49+156
财政层级变革如何影响了地方政府横向税收竞争行为?
基金项目(Foundation): 浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题项目(11JCYJ02YB);; 国家自然科学青年基金项目(71403040)的阶段性成果
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DOI: 10.14167/j.zjss.2017.02.004
发布时间: 2017-02-15
出版时间: 2017-02-15
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摘要:

渐进式的财政省直管县改革在取消地市级财政参与县级税收收入分成的同时,不仅将地市级财政与县级财政的税收竞争关系从"父子竞争"关系转变成了"兄弟竞争"关系,也造成了省直管县地区和市管县地区财政地位的不平等。本文结合全国1628个县级行政区2000-2009年的空间面板计量模型检验了省直管县改革中财政层级变化对县级政府非对称税收竞争行为的影响。结果表明:(1)县级横向税收竞争在2005年前属于"打到底线"的竞争,而在2006年后属于"力争上游"的横向竞争关系;(2)省直管县改革具有加强横向税收策略互补关系的倾向,省直管县地区对相邻地区的策略反应强于市管县地区。

Abstract:

Since the 2000 s, China has pushed forward the province-managing-county reform in some provinces as an experiment of flat public management. Changing from the previous "city jurisdiction over counties" model in which counties are placed under the jurisdiction of prefecture-level cities and are placed cities under the jurisdiction of province, the reform adopts a new system in which provincial governments directly manage county governments on fiscal matters, and thus give reformed counties more fiscal autonomy.To identify the asymmetrical effects of local fiscal system reform on the tax strategic interaction, we use a rich Chinese database, which provides information on all kinds of taxes collected by 1628 counties or cities during the period 2000~2009. The results of two-regime spatial panel data models show that(1) decentralization of taxation to lower-level governments can give rise to a "race to the bottom" in tax rates setting before2005 and a "race to the top" in tax rates setting after 2006;(2) Both counties in "city jurisdiction over counties" regime have stronger strategic complementarity behavior in tax rate setting than counties in "provincial administration of counties" regime.

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(1)数据来源:审计署2010年《17个省区市财政管理情况审计调查结果》。

(2)数据来源:财政部2013年出版的《中国财政情况(2012-2013)》,北京:经济科学出版社。

基本信息:

DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2017.02.004

中图分类号:F812.42

引用信息:

[1]吕凯波,喻超.财政层级变革如何影响了地方政府横向税收竞争行为?[J].浙江社会科学,2017,No.246(02):40-49+156.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2017.02.004.

基金信息:

浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题项目(11JCYJ02YB);; 国家自然科学青年基金项目(71403040)的阶段性成果

发布时间:

2017-02-15

出版时间:

2017-02-15

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