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作为司法活动的一项基本要求，同案同判有着两种不同的理解方式：一是作为司法政策的同案同判；二是作为推理方式的同案同判。后一种具有概念上的独立价值，而不是仅成为司法政策的一种通俗表述。指导性案例在司法体制中的定位，既表明参照指导性案例是一项法律义务，又表明参照的内容可以是前案说理中体现的抽象法律理由。指导性案例本身的复杂性也提供了对同案同判原则进行更为抽象化理论建构的可能性，即从作为理由之治的司法裁判过程出发，实质性理由既是判断类案的依据，也构成待决案件裁判的核心理由。实质性的同案同判观不仅具有坚实的理论基础，能深化我们对平等原则的理解，而且在实践上也有助于引导指导性案例的更广泛的运用。
Abstract：As a basic requirement of judicial activities,“treating like cases alike” has two different ways of understanding: one is “treating like cases alike” as a judicial policy; The second is “treating like cases alike” as a way of reasoning. The latter has independent conceptual value and will not only become a popular expression of judicial policy. The orientation of guiding cases in the judicial system not only shows that referring to guiding cases is a legal obligation; It also shows that the content of reference may be the abstract legal reasons embodied in the reasoning of the previous cases. The complexity of the guiding case itself provides the possibility of more abstract theoretical construction of the principle of “treating like cases alike”,that is, starting from the judicial judgment process as the rule of reasons, the substantive reasons are not only the basis for judging similar cases, but also the core reasons for the judgment of pending cases. The substantive concept of “treating like cases alike” not only has a solid theoretical foundation and deepens our understanding of the principle of equality, but also helps to guide the wider use of guiding cases in practice.
(1)H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Third Edition,Oxford University Press,2012,p.205.
(2)类案类判是同案同判的一种更为准确的说法,本文在等同的意义上使用这两个术语。
(3)张志铭:《中国法院案例指导制度价值功能之认知》,《学习与探索》2012年第3期。
(4)周少华:《刑事案件“同案同判”的理性审视》,《法商研究》2020年第3期。
(5)Peter Westen,"The Empty Idea of Equality",Harvard Law Review,Vol.95,No.3(Jan.,1982),p.547.
(6)Ibid.
(7)Chaim Perelman,The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument,J.Petrietrans.,Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963,p.38.
(8)A.M.Honore,"Social Justice",McGill Law Journal.Vol.8,No.2(1962),p.82.
(9)陈景辉:《同案同判:法律义务还是道德要求》,《中国法学》2013年第3期;孙海波:《类似案件应类似审判吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2019年第3期。
(10)Andrei Marmor,"Should Like C.ases Be Treated Alike?",Legal Theory,Vo1.11,No.1(Mar.,2005),p.27.
(11)Joseph Raz,The Authority of Law,Second Edition,Oxford University Press,2009,p.202.
(12)Andrei Marmor,"Should Like C.ases Be Treated Alike?",Legal Theory,Vol.11,No.1(Mar.,2005),p.31.
(13)Ibid.
(14)Andrei Marmor,"Should Like C.ases Be Treated Alike?",Legal Theory,Vol.11,No.1(Mar.,2005),p.32;Julia Driver."Caesar's Wife:On the Moral Significance of Appearing Good",The Journal of Philosophy,Vol.89,No.7(Jul.,1992),pp.331-343.
(15)(19)(47)陈景辉:《同案同判:法律义务还是道德要求》,《中国法学》2013年第3期。
(16)Leslie Green,"Legal Obligation and Authority",The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos ophy(Winter 2012 Edition),Edward N.Zalta(ed.),URL=;HLA Hart,Essays on Bentham,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.254-255.
(17)Leslie Green,"Legal Obligation and Authority";Joseph Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,Princeton University Press,1990,pp.35-84.
(10)孙海波:《“同案同判”与司法的本质——为依法裁判立场再辩护》,《中国法律评论》2020年第2期。
(20)David A.Strauss,"Must Like C.ases Be Treated Alike?”(University of Chicago Public Law&Legal Theory Working Paper No.24,2002),https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory,p.18.
(21)Ibid.,pp.14-19.
(22)张骐:《试论指导性案例的“指导性”》,《法制与社会发展》2007年第6期。
(23)这里关于指导性案例的性质在于其正确性的分析类似于Alexy关于法律正确性的主张,法律的效力来自于内容的正确性。See Robert Alexy,Law's Ideal Dimenuion,Oxford University Press,2021.
(24)(26)陈坤:《基于可驳斥性逻辑的法律推理研究》,中国社会科学出版社2021年版,第277、281-285页。
(25)陈坤:《基于可驳斥性逻辑的法律推理研究》,第2 7 8页。在道义逻辑中,确实可以这么认为,“0(应当)”是一个基本的逻辑算子,但需注意的是,在道德哲学中,一般认为应当与义务是有差异的。比如拉兹指出:“一个人应当去做他有义务做的事情,但他并不总是有义务去做他应当做的事情。"See Joseph Raz,"Right-based Moralities",in Jeremy Waldron(ed.),Theories of Rights,Oxford University Press,1984,p.184.
(27)时任最高人民法院研究室主任的胡云腾认为,“应当参照”的含义是:“应当就是必须。当法官在审理类似案例时,应当参照未参照的,必须有能够令人信服的理由。”参见蒋安杰:《人民法院案例指导制度的构建》,《法制资讯》2011年第1期。
(28)Heidi M.Hurd对此种权威模式提出了一个比较严格的表达式:当且仅当作为X关于Y应当做φ之陈述的一个结果,Y有一个理由相信存在(依赖于内容的)Y应当做φ的理由,那么X对Y拥有理论权威。See Heidi M.Hurd,"Challenging Authority",The Yale Law Journal,Vol.100,No.6(Apr.,1991),p.1616.
(29)Andrei Marmor,"The Dilemma of Authority",Jurisprudeice,Vol.2,No.1(Jun.,2011),p.132.
(30)谢晖:《“应当参照”否议》,《现代法学》2014年第2期。
(31)宋旭光:《论法学中的可废止性》,《法制与社会发展》2019年第2期;陈坤:《可废止法律推理与法治》,《法制与社会发展》2019年第6期。
(32)Andrei Marmor,"Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?",Legal Theory,Vol.11,No.1(Mar.,2005),p.32.
(33)Ronald Dworkin,Law's Empire,Harvard University Press,1986.
(34)Joseph Raz,Between Authority and Interpretation,Oxford University Press,2010,p.320.
(35)Ibid.,p.317.
(36)「法]玛蒂尔德,柯恩:《作为理由之治的法治》,杨贝译,《中外法学》2010年第3期。
(37)Neil MacCormick,Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory,Oxford University Press,1978,p.15.
(38)Frederick Schauer,"Precedent",in Andrei Marmor(ed.),The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law,Routledge,p.123.
(39)Joseph Raz,"Reasoning with Rules",Current LegalProblems,Vol.54(2001),pp.1-18.
(40)Joseph Raz,The Authority of Law,Second Edition,Oxford University Press,2009,p.202.
(41)Ibid.,p.203.
(42)Ibid.,p.204.
(43)Andrei Marmor,"Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?",Legal The ory,Vol.11,No.1(Mar.,2005),pp.36-3 8.
(44)Ronald Dworkin,Law's Empire,Harvard University Press,1986,p.165.
(45)lbid.,pp.165-167.
(46)陈景辉似乎认为,整全性(他译为“原则一贯性”)构成了同案同判的内在理由,而且他还认为,在德沃金的论述中二者的关系相当混乱,既认为二者等同,又认为二者之间存在明显的区别。参见陈景辉:《同案同判:法律义务还是道德要求》,《中国法学》2013年第3期。我认为,陈景辉误解了德沃金的论述,二者之间不具有这种关系。
(48)Ronald Dworkin,Law's Empire,Harvard University Press,1986,p.165.
(49)David A.Strauss,"Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike?"(University of Chicago Public Law&Legal Theory Working Paper No.24,2002),https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory,p.14.
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2022.04.006
中图分类号:D926.2
引用信息:
[1]朱振.从依据到理由——迈向一种实质性的同案同判观[J].浙江社会科学,2022,No.308(04):36-44+69+157.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2022.04.006.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金青年项目“法官决策模型及其影响因子研究”中期研究成果（项目编号16CFX001）
2022-04-12
2022-04-12