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"公地悲剧"与"反公地悲剧"在产权结构上存在着明显的差异:公地悲剧是一种由于排他性产权缺失或太弱造成竞用性资源被过度使用的悲剧;而反公地悲剧则是指资源或产权过度分割以致破碎化,导致资源排他性过强,进而造成资源使用不足的悲剧,它在产权结构上与公地悲剧存在明显区别。虽然在数理模型上可以推导出公地悲剧与反公地悲剧对称的结论,但是该结论在实验经济学领域存在较大争议——在两种不同博弈情境下,被试者具有不同、甚至相反的社会心理学反应,结果导致反公地悲剧造成的福利损失比公地悲剧更加严重。
Abstract：There is apparent difference in their property right structure: the tragedy of the Commons is due to the lack of exclusive property rights, which leads to overuse of the competitive resource; while the tragedy of the Anti-commons results from the over-segmentation or even fragmentation of the resource per se or its property rights, which makes the exclusive property rights too strong and further results in underuse or even nonuse of the resource. It can be deduced that the tragedy of the Commons and the tragedy of the Anticommons are symmetrical by mathematical model, while in fields of experimental economics this conclusion seems controversial——under the two different game situations, the subjects showed different or even opposite social psychology reaction, and the welfare loss caused by the tragedy of the Anti-commons was more serious than that of the tragedy of the Commons.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2019.03.001
中图分类号:F062.6
引用信息:
[1]阳晓伟,杨春学.“公地悲剧”与“反公地悲剧”的比较研究[J].浙江社会科学,2019,No.271(03):4-13+38+155.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2019.03.001.
基金信息:
国家社科基金重点项目“经济思想史的知识社会学研究”(14AZD109);国家社科基金重大项目“社会源危险废弃物环境责任界定与治理机制研究”(16ZDA072);; 宁波市科技计划重大项目“村镇生态化治理及社区可持续发展研究集成示范”(2015C11001)
2019-03-14
2019-03-14