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德肖维茨的权利来源论降低了事实性/有效性这个问题的难度并误置了解决问题的场域,对其理论的反思表明权利来源的核心问题是权利的安定性、规范效力与内容的正确性之间的关系。法律权利既在实在法意义上存在,又在规范意义上存在。权利与价值相关联,但是这种关联具有不可穿透性的特点。权利的实在性在实践推理的意义上具有独立的价值,但在疑难案件中又需要我们打开"无知之幕",重新检讨权利背后的奠基性理由和深层价值,并结合案件事实重新进行权利推定。价值并不预设普遍必然的有效性,后形而上学时代的价值是特殊的、可伸缩的、局部有效的,是一个寻找共识的过程。在这个过程中,对惨重灾难的历史记忆特别有助于共识的形成,由此我们就为德肖维茨关于权利的历史灾难起源论提供了一个新的存在理由和空间。
Abstract：Dershowitz's theory of the sources of rights reduces the difficulty of the Facticity/Validity and missets the field of solving the problem. The reflection of his theory shows that the core of the sources of rights is the relationship between the stability of the right, the normative validity of the right and the correctness of the content. Legal rights exist both in the positive law and in the normative sense. Right is related to value, but this relationship is not penetrable. The reality of right has independent value in the meaning of practical reasoning, but in the hard cases, we need to open the "veil of ignorance", review the underlying reasons and the deep value behind the right, and redefine the right in combination with the facts of the case.The value does not presuppose the universally necessary validity, the value of the era of post-metaphysics is special, extensible and locally effective, and it is a process of finding consensus. In this process, the historical memory of the catastrophic disaster is particularly conducive to the formation of consensus, thus providing a new existence reason and space for Dershowitz's theory of the origin of the historical disaster of rights.
(1)H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.196~198.
(2)Joseph Telushkin, Jewish Wisdom, New York:Morrow,1994, p.43.转引自[美]艾伦·德肖维茨:《你的权利从哪里来?》,黄煜文译,北京大学出版社2014年版,第50页。
(3)See Alon Harel,“Theories of Rights”, in Martin P.Golding and William A. Edmundson(eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp.191-206. Leif Wenar,“Rights”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL=.
(4)这本书的英文版书名并不是中译本的问句表述方式,而是以肯定的形式认为权利来自于错误。See Alan Morton Dershowitz, Rights From Wrongs:A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights, Basic Books, 2005.
(5)See Stephen C. Angle, Human Rights and Chinese Thought, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.104~115.刘禾:《帝国的话语政治:从近代中西冲突看现代世界秩序的形成》(修订译本),生活·读书·新知三联书店2014年版,第146~186页。
(6)参见金观涛、刘青峰:《观念史研究》,法律出版社2010年版,第115~130页。关于19世纪末-20世纪初中国社会思想中之个人自主意义上的权利的研究参见Stephen C. Angle, Human Rights and Chinese Thought, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.130~133.
(7)Alon Harel区分了“内在于一项权利的理由(reasons that are intrinsic to a right)”和“外在于一项权利的理由(reasons that are extrinsic to a right)”:前者指的是,根据这些理由特定的要求就可以被归类为那些权利;后者指的是,那些理由影响了一个要求应该被保护的力量或重要性,但是对于这个要求作为权利的一个实例来说并不具有本质的意义。See Alon Harel,“What Demands Are Rights?An Investigation into the Relation between Rights and Reasons”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1(Spring, 1997), p. 102.比如根据这一解释,商业言论的保护就不能被划入言论自由权类型中,因为保护言论自由权的基础性理由(比如自主性)并不能证成保护商业言论,后者主要的理由在于促进经济繁荣。See See Alon Harel,“What Demands Are Rights? An Investigation into the Relation between Rights and Reasons”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,Vol. 17, No. 1(Spring, 1997), pp. 104~105. Also see Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, New York:Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 194~244.
(8)[美]艾伦·德肖维茨:《你的权利从哪里来?》,黄煜文译,北京大学出版社2014年版,第14页。
(9)参见[美]艾伦·德肖维茨:《你的权利从哪里来?》,黄煜文译,北京大学出版社2014年版,第69、72~73、78~79页。
(10)(12)(13)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)参见[美]艾伦·德肖维茨:《你的权利从哪里来?》,黄煜文译,北京大学出版社2014年版,第5、45~47、8、5、7、8、50、66页。
(11)Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, New York:Penguin, 2004, p.60.转引自[美]艾伦·德肖维茨:《你的权利从哪里来?》,黄煜文译,北京大学出版社2014年版,第1页。
(14)Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1977, pp.177, xi, 184.
(20)德肖维茨对这一观点的详细解释参见[美]艾伦·德肖维茨:《你的权利从哪里来?》,黄煜文译,北京大学出版社2014年版,第103~104页。
(21)比如,菲尼斯(John Finnis)认为:“没有一个关于法律的自然法理论曾经主张过,‘成为法律,一个规范必须为道德所要求’,或者‘所有的法律要求也是’——这一点独立于有效地被证实为法律——‘道德的要求’。自然法理论家认为,诸如‘在城市街道时速不能超过35英里’这样一个正义的和有效制定的法律规则的内容直到被制定这一规则的司法(法律机构)法律权威有效证实才为道德所要求。关于法律的自然法理论的中心任务是解释‘纯粹实在的’法律之制定怎样能创设道德的义务,而直到制定的那一刻起这些义务才存在。”John Finnis,“Natural Law:TheClassical Tradition”, in Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.20~21.这是菲尼斯在回应法实证主义者Jules L. Coleman and Brian Leiter对其权威理论的批评时所写下的一段话,如下这个总结几乎成为批评自然法理论的标配,但其实也许是基于误解:“要成为法律,一个规范必须为道德所要求。一个规范是道德的一个要求这一事实给予了行动者遵循它的一个(也许是首要的)理由,在这个意义上道德具有权威。”Jules L.Coleman and Brian Leiter,“Legal Positivism”, in Dennis Patterson, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.:Blackwell, 1996, p.244.
(22)Jeremy Waldron,“Kant’s Legal Positivism”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 7(May, 1996), p.1545.
(23)Immanuel Kant,“Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right”, in The Metaphysics of Morals 33,§44,[Ak. 312](1797), Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.124.
(24)Leviathan(1651), ch. Xiv; Raphael, British Moralists,para. 57. Quoted from John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.208.
(25)John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.208.
(26)Ibid., p.210.
(27)(28)Jeremy Waldron, p.1541.
(29)See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.211. See also H. L. A.Hart,“Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1983.
(30)Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg, Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press, 1996, p.255.
(31)德沃金的结论以这样一种观念为预设,亦即权利具有一种规范的或是道德的力量,凭借这一点,权利据此推定凌驾于与之相竞争的公共利益之上。这种观点同样为很多哲学家所持有。参见例如Robert Alexy,“Individual Rights and Collective Goods”, in C. Nino(eds.), Rights, New York:New York University Press, 1992, pp.178-179. Ronald Dworkin,“Rights as Trumps”, in Jeremy Waldron(eds.),Theories of Rights, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1984, p.153. David Lyons,“Utility and Rights”, in David Lyons(eds.), Rights, Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory, New York:Oxford University Press, 1994, p.152.
(32)Jürgen Habermas, p.256.
(33)Ibid., p.258.
(34)Ibid., p.259.
(35)Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, 34, 269(1973), 304.这是德国联邦宪法法院在1973年2月14日的决议中通过引用基本法第20条第3款(the Basic Law, Art.20, Sec. 3)而做出的一个结论。转引自Jürgen Habermas,Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg,Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press, 1996, p.244.
(36)Joseph Raz,“Reasoning By Rule”, in his Between Authority and Interpretation:On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.205.
(37)Ibid., p.208.
(38)Ibid., p.210.
(39)Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA:Belknap Press, 1981, p.499.
(40)Ronald Dworkin,“Do We Have a Right to Pornograph?”, in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp.335~372.
(41)对权利的一般性论述参见William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Duncan Ivison, Rights, Acumen Publishing Limited, 2008.关于权利这三种预设的分类参见徐向东:《自我、他人与道德——道德哲学导论》(下册),商务印书馆2009年版,第741页。
(42)John Finnis,“Natural Law:The Classical Tradition”,Duncan Ivison, Rights, Acumen Publishing Limited, 2008.关于权利这三种预设的分类参见徐向东:《自我、他人与道德——道德哲学导论》(下册),商务印书馆2009年版,第741页。in Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law,Oxford University Press, 2002, p.25.
(43)Jürgen Habermas, p.262.
(44)Ibid., p.230.
(45)Ibid., p.256.
(46)Ibid., p.257.
(47)相关论述参见王鹏翔:《规则是法律推理的排他性理由吗?》,载王鹏翔主编:《2008法律思想与社会变迁》,“中央研究院”法律学研究所筹备处(台北)2008年版,第345~386页。
(48)Jürgen Habermas, p.384.
(49)[英]以赛亚·伯林:《自由论》,胡传胜译,译林出版社2003年版,第244~245页。
(50)Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity:Chapters in the History of Ideas, Second Edition, Princeton University Press, 2013, p.14.
(51)See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Belknap Press, 2013.
(52)Jürgen Habermas, p.255.
(53)Jürgen Habermas, p.257.
(54)李俊增:《论违宪审查之程序理性——从Dworkin独白取向之裁判理论到Habermas之司法法律论辩理论》,载《“中研院”法学期刊》(台北)2015年第16期,第166~167页。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14167/j.zjss.2018.10.003
中图分类号:D920.0
引用信息:
[1]朱振.事实性与有效性张力中的权利——关于权利来源的省思[J].浙江社会科学,2018,No.266(10):13-23+155.DOI:10.14167/j.zjss.2018.10.003.
基金信息:
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“权利视野下法治政府建设的理论与实践研究”(16JJD820005)的阶段性成果
2018-10-15
2018-10-15