浙江社会科学

本文以如何促进跨境电子商务发展为出发点,将政府与企业间的关系视为跨境电子商务市场这一复杂网络中的博弈关系,构建了政府激励机制监管模型,假设政府的奖励制度(即扶持性政策)对企业开展跨境电子商务有影响,研究了政府扶持性政策在促进跨境电子商务发展中的有效性问题。通过博弈机制下的仿真模拟得到了如下两个结论:第一,政府的扶持性政策能够显著提升地区内企业跨境电子商务参与性,尤其是短期效果最明显,但是,同一种政策的长期促进效果是微弱的。第二,对于外贸基础条件薄弱的地区,政府扶持性政策的短期效果更加明显,但政策失效的速度也更快。

In order to improve the development of cross-border e-commerce, this paper takes the cross-border e-commerce market as a complex network and the relationship between the government and the enterprises as gambling relationship. The paper builds government incentive regulation model to suppose that the reward system of the government which actually is supportive policy has an effect on cross-border e-commerce adoption of the enterprises. At last, the paper verifies the validity of government incentive mechanism for the development of cross-border e-commerce. Two conclusions are given from the simulations:(1)the government supportive policy can always enhance the percentage of the total number of enterprises that choose cross-border e-commerce within the region. However, results show a most obvious effect of short-term incentives, and little long-term effect of a policy.(2)In the underdeveloped region, the government supportive policy has a more significant effect in the short-time compared with the developed areas, as well as a more rapid failure velocity.